xtrain wrote:
In regard to the Schlieffen plan, this is what it says on Wikipedia, which matches my recollection of my European history class:
The Schlieffen Plan (German: Schlieffen-Plan, pronounced [ʃliːfən plaːn]) was one of the German General Staff's early-20th-century war-plans. It was adopted as Deployment Plan Aufmarsch I in 1905 and modeled an isolated Franco-German war in which Russia would not attack Germany, but Italy and Austria-Hungary might help attack France. As it was assumed that France would be on the defensive in such a war, since her forces would be outnumbered, Aufmarsch I stated that Germany would have to go on the offensive if she wanted to end the war (on favourable terms). Aufmarsch I thus deployed Germany's entire army on the German-Belgian border in anticipation of an offensive into France through Belgium and trusted that Italian and Austro-Hungarian troops would defend Alsace-Lorraine. While the plan did not anticipate swift or immediate victory and had no set timetable, it did envisage forcing the smaller French Army into a Decisive Battle in which much of it would be destroyed, increasing the German Army's superiority for further operations which would eventually see the total defeat of France.|
A smidge farther down on that Wiki article, xt:
"German Deployment Plans, 1905–1914
Aufmarsch I - isolated Franco-German war, perhaps with Germany's allies helping her out (Italians attack on Franco-Italian border and both Italy and Austria-Hungary send forces to Germany). France will be on the defensive because she will be grossly outnumbered, so to bring about a (favorable) end to the war Germany (and her allies) will have to attack her. Operational Plan after the deployment of the entire German Army in the west is to launch an offensive through Belgium-Luxembourg with most of the German Army and rely on the Austro-Hungarian and Italian forces to hold the fortresses along the (pre-war) Franco-German border. Aufmarsch I West looks less and less likely to be used as strength of Franco-Russian alliance is made clear and Britain aligns herself with France, making Italy unwilling to support Germany. It is scrapped as it becomes clear that an isolated Franco-German war is an impossibility, and that Germany's allies won't help her even if it did happen somehow.
Aufmarsch II West - War between Franco-Russian Entente and Germany, with Britain maybe assisting the Entente and Germany's allies (Austria-Hungary, Italy so long as Britain doesn't join France) maybe helping her. 80% of German Army in west, 20% in east. France and Russia will attack because they have the larger force, so Germany will be on the defensive in at least the first operation/campaign of the war and execute a counter-offensive against the French offensive when it comes - but instead of pursuing retreating French force, 1/4 of German force in west (20% of total German force) will transfer to east to launch counter-offensive against Russian offensive. Aufmarsch II West becomes the main German deployment plan as Germany's strategic situation worsens in the immediate pre-war years.
Aufmarsch II West is implemented in August 1914 but using the overall strategy of Aufmarsch I, as noted by Holmes."
BT probably would have been better served by rephrasing the question and simply asking whose plan was used by the Germans in WWI which would have alleviated this sort of scenario. Of course, knowing those kids, they likely would have included Von Moltke as a distractor and we'd be having this discussion for a completely different reason.